¶ … Akrasia: Aristotle and Socrates Akrasia, translated as lack of self-restraint or weakness of will, is a problematic concept in explaining bad states of character for many philosophers because of inconsistencies regarding the possibility of its existence. Both Socrates and Aristotle held drastically different views on it. Socrates denied the existence of akrasia, arguing that it would be impossible for someone with full knowledge to depart from what they know, and therefore their misbehavior can only be attributable to ignorance. Aristotle, on the other hand, suggests in Nicomachean Ethics VII that an individual, even with full knowledge, can act otherwise when he becomes weak-willed. Though Aristotle argues at length to point out the flaws in Socrates' argument on the impossibility of akrasia, asserting that a man can act against his better judgment (whereas Socrates simply says that he is mistaken in his judgment and that is why he acts wrongly), he does not ultimately refute Socrates or settle the matter definitively. In other words, both argue correctly and yet neither need be right as a rule.

Aristotle's objections to Socrates' view -- that knowledge cannot be overrun by anything else -- centers around the question of "how a man who judges rightly can behave incontinently." There are two parts to the question, according to Aristotle: impetuosity and weakness. The impetuous man is the passionate man, who knows but allows his passions to overrule his reason: "There is a sort of man who is carried away as a result of passions and contrary to the right...

" (1151a20). Then there is the weak-willed man, who man know the right rule but act otherwise -- perhaps due to some peer pressure or some other external force that exploits an internal weakness.
Aristotle essentially asserts that "having" and "using" knowledge are two different things; in other words, a man might have knowledge but not exercise it. For Socrates, knowledge is inviolable. It is akin to a state of grace -- or holiness. If it is possessed, a person cannot but act justly. If a person acts unjustly, that is, without holiness, then he is not in a state of holiness -- he is momentarily dispossessed of knowledge. For Socrates, all virtues are of the same essence and therefore knowledge and holiness are one. This is the reason that Socrates argues that akrasia is an impossibility. Aristotle, on the other hand, does not liken knowledge to holiness, but like Protagoras insists that the two are distinct even though they may have an essence that is similar. Aristotle asserts that knowledge does not necessarily impel a man to act on it. He may possess the knowledge but he might lack the virtue to -- whether it be called the will, the holiness, the motivation, the grace, etc.

For instance, Socrates' argument would proceed thus: suppose the man knows the simple, universal premise that "all vegetables are good for men" and that "he is a man," but not the particular premise that "this is a vegetable"; then, in such case, the man will deviate from his knowledge accidentally or through ignorance. This is similar to the case where the man becomes…